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During the reign of King David Kalakaua, the political, economic and
social affairs of the Hawaiian Kingdom became seriously upset. A series
of events during the years from 1880 to 1886 created economic and
political instability and aggravated already serious class and racial
antipathies to such an extent that by 1887 the country was on the verge
of class warfare. The resulting reaction on the part of a large group of
mostly white business and professional leaders against Kalakaua and his
predominantly native supporters produced the first serious revolt against
the Monarchy, established a new Constitution in 1887 which only
increased the tensions in Hawaiian society, and led finally to the over-
throw of the Monarchy in 1893. It is difficult to point to any single event
during these turbulent years as being decisive in influencing the outcome
leading to the revolt of 1887 and the establishment of the new constitu-
tion in that year; instead one must consider the cumulative effect of a
number of events.1 Most serious students agree that one of those events
was the controversy which developed between the government and the
business community over the introduction into the kingdom of a new
coinage in 1883.
The main characteristic of the Hawaiian monetary system in 1883 w a s
the fact that for all practical purposes it was an extension of the system
of the United States. This in turn was a reflection of the high degree of
integration of Hawaii's economy with that of the United States. Although
foreign coins other than American—mostly British and Spanish coins—
also were in circulation and were recognized as legal tender, the great
majority of coins in use were American. That the integration was clearly
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recognized was shown by the Currency laws of 1846, 1859,
1876; these laws made U.S. gold coin legal tender at face value to pay
all debts in the kingdom, while U.S. silver coin was legal tender for
debts up to fifty dollars. Other coins were also legal tender, but were
subject to varying discounts.2 Yet many felt the need for a new coinage
which was distinctly Hawaiian. From the point of view of the bankers
and merchants there was nothing to be gained from it in the economic
sense, but most agreed it would have high symbolic value by stimulating
national pride, which certainly needed stimulating. The native Hawaiian
population in particular had been sinking into a deeper apathy for
several decades, primarily because of the gradual decline in its numbers
but also because the domination of economic and social affairs by the
haoles, or white men, had largely spelled the end of the old Hawaiian
culture, especially in Honolulu itself. Recognition of the low morale of
the Hawaiian people was a primary factor in the desire of both Kalakaua
and a leading haole politician who championed the native Hawaiians,
Walter Murray Gibson, to restore the lost glories of the Hawaiians by
carrying out projects which appealed to their pride and attempted to
restore their heritage.
The legal vehicle for establishing the new coinage was the Currency
law of 1880. Pushed by Gibson as chairman of the Finance Committee
in the Legislative Assembly, the new coinage would, according to
Gibson, "inspire the confidence of the people, and add to the prestige
of the Kingdom."3 The law provided that the Hawaiian government
would purchase both gold and silver bullion and would have it minted
into coins for general circulation on a par with United States coins,
which they would eventually replace. The intention was clearly to
maintain the general validity of the currency as it then stood with a
balance between gold and silver, and it was upon this understanding that
the Ministry of Samuel G. Wilder, the Premier in 1880, supported the
passage of the coinage bill.4
The coinage law was not immediately implemented. Unlike the native
Hawaiians, the haole business leaders' patriotism was not particularly
stimulated by the prospect of Hawaiian rather than United States coins
in circulation, and there was consequently no significant pressure placed
upon the Wilder administration to carry out the law, nor was there any
pressing financial reason for doing so. It was not until 1882, when
Kalakaua replaced the W. L. Green Ministry with one headed by
Gibson as Premier, that any serious attention was given officially to
implementing the currency legislation. A "new departure" in Hawaiian
politics then began. With Gibson dominating both the government and
the Legislative Assembly, several projects were launched "to increase
the prestige of the Kingdom." One of these was the new coinage, which
would be distinctively Hawaiian and would bear the coat of arms and
motto of the kingdom and also the profile—admittedly a handsome
one—of Kalakaua himself.5
What happened next was unfortunate. Most citizens stood either for
the coinage or believed it would do no harm, but the assumption was
that it would be judiciously administered. At this point another indivi-
dual appeared on the scene. He had already been a source of unofficial
financial aid to both Kalakaua and Gibson, in return for favors, and now
he saw another opportunity to demand, and to receive, special considera-
tion from the government. This man was Claus Spreckels, the West
Coast sugar magnate. Through his connections with the Hawaiian sugar
trade he was now in process of extending his financial empire to include
sugar plantations in the islands, a trans-Pacific steamship company, and
also a banking institution to be established in Honolulu.6 He had already
been approached by Gibson to advance the money necessary to pay for
the Hawaiian coinage, and soon he hit upon the idea of making even
more profit by arranging for the coinage as well as advancing the money
to pay for it. Early in 1883 he was authorized by Gibson to provide a
million dollars worth of Hawaiian silver coin from the San Francisco
mint in exchange for a million dollars worth of 6 per cent gold bonds
authorized by the 1882 Loan Act.
It would appear that Spreckels' only profit would be the interest on
the bonds, but there was a hidden profit as well. The silver content of
the Hawaiian coins which were struck was about 84 per cent, somewhat
lower than the normal for U.S. silver coins, and thus Spreckels gained
approximately $150,000 in additional profit from his arrangement.
Normally, in such a case the government concerned negotiates directly
with the mint, and the difference between the value of the bullion and
the face value of the coins is either kept by the mint or returned to the
contracting government. The arrangement with Spreckels, however,
was unusual and was so recognized at the time.7 Gold was not included
in the coinage, even though clearly provided for in the law, because the
profit on silver would be much higher. In retrospect it is clear that the
primary motive of Spreckels was to make a good profit, while the
Hawaiian government's main interest was to fulfill an obligation to
Spreckels. The financial well-being of the kingdom was of secondary
importance.
Another point needs to be made in order to understand fully the
nature of the difficulties caused by the Hawaiian coinage. At the time
Kalakaua's coins were struck the United States was officially on a
bimetallic standard, but practically on a gold standard. Since 1873 the
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Treasury had not accepted silver for coinage into United States specie.
The purpose of this move was to prevent an excessive amount of silver
coin from upsetting the balance between gold and silver. Although after
1878 the government resumed the coinage of some silver under the terms
of the Bland-Allison Act, it was convertible into gold, thus putting the
country effectively on a gold standard. So long as silver coin was conver-
tible, and so long as the amount in circulation did not rise too rapidly
American businessmen were content, for the problem was to maintain
business and public confidence in both metals. A failure of confidence in
one would quickly drive the other out of circulation.
In Hawaii the situation was more complex. Since the basis of the
circulating medium in Hawaii was American specie, it followed that any
change in the monetary situation in the United States would have
repercussions in Kalakaua's kingdom. As it happened, the balance
between gold and silver in circulation in the kingdom was much more
precarious than it was in the United States. For one thing, both in the
United States and in Hawaii certain kinds of debts, notably customs
duties, were payable only in gold. This increased the relative value of
gold. For another, silver could be more easily obtained in the financial
markets, and also was more easily shipped than gold, and during the
late 1870s the importation of silver to meet the expanding needs of
Hawaiian business grew so rapidly it was feared that gold might be
driven out of circulation.8 In 1880 the Hawaiian government placed a
10 per cent import duty on silver to try to control the problem, but
this action had little effect.9 Finally, overproduction of sugar had been
developing, and by late 1883 sugar prices began to fall. By 1884 a serious
recession was underway in the islands, continuing until the latter part
of 1885.
It was into the midst of this already unstable financial situation that
Kalakaua's coins were introduced. The first shipment of the coins
arrived in early December, i88310 and produced a local furor in the
business community. Fearful that the introduction of so much silver
into the kingdom would cause a rapid inflation, and probably also seeking
a confrontation to embarrass the government, a number of haole
businessmen sought legal recourse to prevent the Hawaiian silver from
going into circulation. Acting as spokesmen for the businessmen.
William R. Castle, Sanford B. Dole and William O. Smith petitioned
for a writ of mandamus to compel the Minister of Finance to take only
gold coin for the gold bonds which the government was to give Spreckels
as payment for his silver. If successful this move would effectively kill
the introduction of the silver coin. The writ was granted on December
18, but on appeal the government secured a reversal on the ground that
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mandamus was not the proper remedy.11 An injunction was then sought,
but on January 7, 1884, was refused on the ground that the Minister of
Finance had given public assurances that the gold bonds would be
exchanged only for gold or its equivalent value in silver. Since no illegal
act was about to be committed there could be no grounds for an
injunction.12 To put the stamp of legality upon the payment of Spreckels'
silver for the bonds, the Privy Council had met on December 18 and had
declared that the Hawaiian silver was of like fineness to United States
silver and therefore legal tender at nominal value.13 After the court
decision of January 7, there was no recourse for those who feared
financial disaster, and over the next several weeks the available Kalakaua
silver coin was put into circulation.
In spite of the fears of a large proportion of the business community,
it was not necessarily true that the introduction of the Hawaiian silver
would bring on a disaster. If the process would be simply one of sub-
stituting the Hawaiian coin for foreign and United States silver coin no
serious dislocation would result. There would be some difficulty in trade
with the United States, caused by the fact that American banks accepted
at full face value only United States coin—foreign specie was discounted
at various rates—and thus the cost of business with the mainland would
be increased if the Hawaiian coin replaced U.S. in the islands. But this
problem could probably be worked out by the businessmen themselves,
as indeed it was to a large extent over the next few years.
The real difficulty with the Hawaiian specie lay in the fact that it was
far more than was necessary to simply replace existing silver in circula-
tion. If all of it was added to the money supply it would upset the
gold-silver balance. Gold coin would thus be driven out of circulation,
most of it ending up on the mainland through the debt paying process.
There was also the real threat of severe local inflation caused by increas-
ing the total money supply by a million dollars worth of new coin, for
in spite of the intent of the currency legislation it was evident that the
Kalakaua coinage would not go into circulation as replacement for other
silver coin but rather would do so through the process of government
payments for goods and services.14 The sad fact of the matter was that
in the wake of the revelation of the deal with Spreckels, plus the increas-
ing fears caused by the government's activities and intentions since
Gibson became Premier, a large proportion of the business and pro-
fessional people in the Kingdom had lost faith in the Hawaiian govern-
ment. This, plus the understanding that the new money was not as
valuable as its equivalent in gold coin, and finally the general anxiety
brought on by the increasing grip of recession on the kingdom, all
combined to produce a general distrust of what in principle should have
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caused little trouble.15 All this could probably have been avoided if the
Hawaiian government had contracted directly with the San Francisco
mint and if the contract had included a proper proportion of gold coin
as well as silver. But this was not done because Spreckels' desires were
more important than the financial needs of the kingdom.
With the failure of the anti-Gibson businessmen to stop the introduc-
tion of the coinage, the financial situation quickly became the most
discussed topic in Honolulu, and the more it was discussed the more
unsettled the community became. Many people were simply refusing to
take the Hawaiian silver in payment of debts, while United States coins
were disappearing from circulation.16 The pressing financial difficulty
seems to have been the biggest factor which gave strength to the new
political party which had been organized to oppose Gibson in the
legislature.17 The election campaign reached its peak in late January and
early February, 1884, with the election itself being held on February 6.
This coincides with the period when agitation over the financial situation
was becoming noticeable. It should be noted that the outcome of the
election was being anxiously awaited not only in Hawaii but also in the
United States and elsewhere. Businessmen in these areas also were
clearly distrustful of Gibson and his policies, as was shown by the
difficulty the Hawaiian government experienced in selling the bonds of
its two million dollar loan program passed in 1882. As of mid-1883 none
of its bonds had yet been sold,18 and its failure to secure enough operat-
ing funds to meet the large budget passed in 1882 was largely responsible
for Gibson's willingness to make the coinage deal with Spreckels. As
late as July 1885 the Hawaiian government was still advertising for
tenders on part of the 1882 loan.19
The Election of 1884 seemed to indicate a solution to the financial
crisis in the near future which would be acceptable to the Hawaiian
businessmen. Although they did not win outright, the opposition
Independent Party gained thirteen seats out of twenty-eight in the House
of Representatives, the elective body in the Legislative Assembly. With
such strength and with a working alliance with a number of members of
the House of Nobles, the other body in the Assembly, the Independents
were able to defeat a number of Administration bills and pass some
which they favored. Among the latter was a new Currency Act.
The Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, the chief organization of the
local businessmen, had naturally become intimately involved in the
expressions of concern of the business community. In the period after
November 1883, and continuing until the spring of 1885, the monetary
question was the subject of more meetings of the Chamber than any
other, and at these meetings all kinds of moves to meet the growing
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currency crisis were discussed. The ultimate consensus was that little
could be done within the existing legal framework, and a solution to the
financial difficulties besetting the community could only come after a
new currency law was adopted.20 To this end the Chamber devoted
considerable effort to securing the passage of such a bill in the 1884
legislative session.
As introduced in the legislative session on May 22 by Sanford Dole,
the proposed bill would require United States gold coins or gold
certificates to be legal tender for debts above five dollars, while United
States and Hawaiian silver were authorized as legal tender for debts up
to five dollars. All other silver was to be redeemed at face value by the
Treasury, which would pay out gold in exchange. In order to get this
gold the Treasury would have to buy it in San Francisco, and the
consequent loss caused by paying out gold in exchange for silver would
be borne by the government and would be provided for in the 1884
appropriation bill.21 The intent of the bill was clearly to favor gold over
silver and to minimize the adverse effects of the Hawaiian silver. It
involved some financial loss to the government, but the bill's supporters
believed that was better than allowing the financial dislocation to con-
tinue and probably worsen. It should also be noted that while the bill
would supercede the Currency Act of 1880 it would also carry through
the intent of several major features of that law, particularly the elimina-
tion of the various kinds of foreign silver other than United States then
in circulation. The new bill, however^ was viewed as an improvement
since it would replace that silver with gold.
As finally passed on June 9, the Currency Act of 1884 differed from
Dole's original bill mainly in allowing silver to be used as legal tender
for debts up to ten dollars instead of five, and in the addition of a
provision limiting the exchange of foreign silver for gold at the Treasury
to no more than $150,000 in any one month.22 Even though slightly
modified, the new currency law was hailed as a major victory by the
Independents.23 Now, they proclaimed, the financial situation would
improve. As gold returned into circulation it would stabilize prices,
while the confidence of the people of the kingdom in both the Kalakaua
and other silver would grow. Finally the monetary system would become
stabilized and systematized, and the Hawaiian silver would find its place
within it. In the long run both the nation and the government would
gain.
So the comments went. However, it soon became evident that these
prophecies would not be borne out by future events, mainly because the
government made no serious efforts to carry out the provisions of the
new law. It is difficult to understand why the businessmen assumed it
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would do so, for Gibson had already shown he was not to be trusted.
The government had allowed Spreckels to get his gold bonds, in spite
of the ruling of the Supreme Court in January. Furthermore the financial
position of the government had weakened considerably since 1882,
making it more difficult for it to find funds with which to redeem foreign
silver coin for gold. Even with the Independents acting as watchdogs,
the 1884 Legislative Assembly had voted a budget of $3,856,755.50, an
amount nearly one and a half million dollars higher than the estimated
revenue.24 This meant more future debt rather than less. By the end of
1884 the public debt was approximately $900,000, and by November
1885 it had climbed to $1,079,000, an enormous sum for such a small
country.25 This was bad enough, but in addition there was the specter of
Spreckels, who by virtue of his bank in Honolulu and his position as
creditor to Gibson and Kalakaua could keep Hawaiian financial affairs
in constant turmoil.
Trouble was not long in coming. Shortly after the Currency Act of
1884 went into effect the Minister of Finance was supposed to make
arrangements to buy gold from abroad in order to build up a stock to
redeem the foreign silver which would come into the Treasury beginning
on December 1. This was not done to any significant degree, however,
in spite of the offer of a San Francisco firm, Grinbaum and Company,
to provide $50,000 worth of United States gold coins in exchange for an
equivalent value in silver coin.26 The Hawaiian government had already
shown its helplessness in September, when it defaulted on the payment
of bonds due on that date and stated it would pay six months later.27
Thus by November it was clear to the businessmen that the Treasury
would probably not redeem silver coin after December 1, and in order
to prevent a financial panic a group of representatives from the Bishop
Bank, Theo. H. Davies and Co., and W. G. Irwin and Co., the three
leading banks, met and agreed that those banks would continue for the
time being to honor Treasury silver certificates and foreign silver coin
at par value.28 This move stabilized the situation temporarily, but even
so many people refused to accept silver or silver certificates for debts
above the legal limit after December 1,29 which caused a suddenly
increased demand for gold. Fearing that people would rush to the
Treasury to redeem their Kalakaua coins for gold, Gibson had his
Attorney General, Paul Neumann, ask the Supreme Court for an
opinion on the meaning of certain provisions of the Currency Act.
Neumann argued that these provisions exempted the Hawaiian silver
from conversion, but the Court disagreed. In an opinion handed down
on December 10 it said the intent of the law was to replace silver with
gold for all but the smallest coin denominations, but this could not be
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done if Hawaiian silver were required to remain in circulation.30 Thus
blocked, the government had no choice but to comply with the law for
the time being. It began paying out what little gold was in the Treasury
in exchange for silver, but the gold soon ran out. The banks' agreement
to accept silver prevented a disaster, but people began to hoard gold.
Confidence in the government and in the Kalakaua silver was now almost
completely gone. Gibson accused the banks of conspiring to bring down
his government by deliberately aggravating the financial situation,31 but
the charge could not be substantiated. In any event he did not admit the
degree to which the government's actions up to the end of 1884 had
contributed to the financial crisis in which the kingdom now found
itself.
As far as the businessmen were concerned, the root of the problem
continued to be the excessive amount of silver in circulation. Nearly
everyone seemed to have something to say on the subject. In discussing
the money bill before the 1884 Legislature, the Daily Bulletin had struck
the theme when it said that even if the bill passed there would still be
too much silver in circulation—according to the Bulletin about $ 1,200,000
worth, or more than twice as much as necessary.32 The Chamber of
Commerce much more conservatively estimated the right amount of
silver to be about $350,000, in view of declining price levels.33 P. C.
Jones, a respected businessman, thought $400,000 was about right.34 So
it went, and distrust bred distrust, further adding to the financial woes.
Businessmen's lack of faith in silver caused them to keep gold in San
Francisco in order to meet their debts without having to pay the 7 to 8
per cent premium charged against silver. This further reduced the gold
supply in Hawaii.35 Several people, including U.S. Minister Daggett,
earlier had urged that the Hawaiian government should require the
payment of customs duties in gold as provided in the law, and this was
done for five months in 1884. But by 1885 Daggett at least voiced no
protest when the government decided to continue to accept silver in
payment for customs duties and to endeavor to hold the money thus
collected out of circulation.36 This did no good, for the government was
forced to pay out the silver to meet obligations about as fast as it was
collected, and after only a short time it went back to accepting only gold
for duty payments.37
By mid-February of 1885 business confidence in the government had
reached nearly the vanishing point. The more exasperated business
leaders were now saying that businessmen should have no further
dealings with the government on the financial question. Instead they
should turn in all their silver certificates for coin, thus drawing silver
entirely out of the Treasury, and afterwards should work out among
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themselves some solution which would adjust the amount of silver in
circulation to conform with the law.38 The more conservative business-
men did not favor such a drastic step, and favored instead continued
negotiations with the government; drastic action, they felt, would bring
about a complete financial collapse.
By this time trust in the government had fallen another notch as a
result of the Treasury's decision to suspend payment of gold coin in
exchange for gold certificates. This was a major blow, for gold certificates
were the most important part of the money supply which still commanded
confidence. But the Treasury's action was made necessary by the low
state of its gold stock, which in turn was mainly caused by its accepting
silver instead of gold in payment of customs duties.39 A gold crisis had
now been reached. On February 13, the day after the Treasury announce-
ment, the Chamber of Commerce met and announced that it was
rescinding its previous agreement to accept Treasury certificates as gold.
In view of the Treasury's action, most businessmen felt the Chamber's
announcement was necessary. The businessmen now turned to silver, of
which the kingdom had a plentiful supply, to solve the problem of the
gold shortage. The main necessity was to keep up the confidence in gold
certificates, and the Bishop Bank offered to issue gold certificates in
exchange for silver coin if the Treasury would agree to maintain a stock
of silver equal to 25 per cent of the value of the gold certificates.40 In a
further development of this idea, the Chamber of Commerce met with
the Minister of Finance on February 25 and offered to continue to
accept silver certificates in payment for debts above the legal limit if the
Treasury would agree to keep in a special account a silver margin of 16
per cent to make up for the difference in exchange value of the two
metals.41 The adoption of these proposals would accomplish essentially
what the 1884 Currency Act required—provision of a silver margin in
the Treasury to guarantee in terms of gold all the silver coin in circulation.
The government reluctantly agreed to take this step, and on February 27
the Treasury announced it would hold about $550,000 in Hawaiian
silver coin, plus an additional margin of 16 per cent, in order to secure
the approximately $550,000 in gold certificates then in circulation. It was
generally believed this step would do much to restore confidence in the
Hawaiian government.42
Confidence may indeed have been restored for the time being, but the
government was not helped much by the agreement. The implementa-
tion of it pulled out of circulation about half the silver coin then
outstanding. This seems to have curbed inflation but left the Treasury
with little money to pay government bills. Luckily the renewed con-
fidence in the government allowed it to begin borrowing on short-term
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notes, but even so it often had difficulty in meeting its bills.43 The public
debt, already high, continued to climb though not at anywhere near the
fantastic rate of 1882-1884, when it jumped from $299,200 to about
$900,ooo.44 By demonstrating a degree of good faith for the first time
in the monetary crisis the Gibson government laid the foundation for
solving it, for regardless of the reasons for the crisis, it was clear that it
could be overcome only with the restoration of confidence in the
government.
As it turned out the crisis was practically at an end. By the spring of
1885 sugar prices began to rise, so within a short time the local recession
was reversed and prosperity returned to the plantation economy. This
development, together with the easing of the monetary crisis by the
February 25 Agreement, quickly brought stability and gave time to
develop a full implementation of the 1884 Currency Act. As customs
receipts and other government revenue began to increase it was possible
to meet expenses with less recourse to borrowing, and also to begin
gradually to build up a gold stock once again. By March 1886 the amount
of gold or gold certificates in circulation was about $1,000,000, just about
balancing the amount of silver.45 The gold had come partly from in-
creased receipts from customs duties and partly from the sale of silver
held by the Treasury.
With the stabilizing of the monetary situation local confidence in
silver increased. Over the next year or two the foreign silver was
gradually withdrawn from circulation and replaced with Kalakaua silver
coins which no longer by their mere sight produced fits of rage among
the local businessmen. After the fall of the Gibson government on June
30, 1887, the last man who was felt to be an evil influence upon the king
and a detriment to the government was eliminated, with consequent
further expressions of joy from the businessmen.46 The Hawaiian silver
continued in circulation during the remaining years of the kingdom.
Even after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1893 and annexation by the
United States in 1898, the coins continued to circulate, though after
annexation they could not be used in payment of United States duties
or taxes. Finally, in 1902 the Chamber of Commerce recommended that
they be redeemed by United States silver, and the following year
Congress passed a law providing for such redemption.47 Thereafter the
coins with the benign countenance of Kalakaua, which had caused such
controversy, passed from the stage of history and into the furnaces of
the San Francisco Mint, except for those which remained in numismatic
collections throughout the world.
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